Everyone is welcome to attend our talks. Refreshments are available before the talks, so come early, get acquainted, and have a bite to eat! The talks are 50 minutes in length, followed by a short break and then 30 minutes of Q&A. Unless otherwise specified, talks are held at 5:00 pm in B316 Tribble Hall.
Please call (336) 758-5359 if you will require special assistance.
Dates and speakers, Fall 2014
- September 25: Stavroula Glezakos – Associate Professor/Associate Chair of Philosophy, Wake Forest University
In this talk, I will argue that, contrary to the well-known saying, words can sometimes hurt us. Moreover, a word can harm even if its user does not intend any harm in using it. My aim will be to explain why this is the case, to show that the class of harmful words is, unfortunately, wider than we perhaps recognize, and to consider what options might be available to those who wish to avoid causing such harm.
- October 15: Christine Swanton – Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, New Zealand
What has been called by Julian Young Heidegger’s ‘ethics of dwelling’ has been deployed in the service of environmental ethics. In the analytic tradition environmental ethics is characteristically understood as a species of applied ethics, but Heidegger’s views on dwelling are fundamental to his philosophy as a whole, since for him, the essence of human beings is to dwell. If we do not properly dwell, realize our essence as dwellers, we have a fundamentally wrong orientation or attunement to the world as a whole. This paper explores this attunement: “dwelling love.”
- October 30: Alison Denham – Associate Professor, Tulane University
“Representing Ethical Estrangement: Pictures, Poetry & Epistemic Value”
Contemporary meta-ethics has developed under the spectre of moral nihilism: scepticism about the very existence of moral values. However, it has seldom addressed the experience of such scepticism – the first-personal loss of, or estrangement from, our most fundamental evaluative commitments. That task has typically been left to the arts. I examine how certain artworks exploit strategies of ‘experiencing-as’ and ‘experience-taking’ to convey the phenemenological dimensions of evaluative thought. I introduce the phenomenon of ethical estrangement as it is articulated by the essayist and survivor, Jean Amery. I then turn to a work of visual art by Anselm Kiefer, the installation Chevirat Ha Kelim and a related poem by Paul Celan, Psalm. I argue that the epistemic value of these works turns in part on their use of aesthetic form to reorient the spectator’s first-personal perceptual and affective responses.
- December 4: Rebecca Copenhaver – Professor of Philosophy, Lewis & Clark College
- February 12, 2015: Ann Cudd – University Distinguished Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas
- March 26, 2015: Jon Garthoff – Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Tennessee
“Animal Punishment” – abstract to follow
- April 9, 2015: Susanna Siegel – Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
Dates and speakers for spring semester 2014
- January 23: Our first talk of the semester, “An Argument for Open Borders,” will be presented by Professor Chris Freiman of William and Mary. Professor Freiman will be a guest of our Philosophy Club, who chose him as their speaker of the year. An event not to be missed!
Abstract: I argue that, all else equal, immigration restriction and deportation are prima facie wrongs of the same magnitude and for the same reason. Consequently, there is an equal presumption against both. I then argue that many of the principles invoked to defeat this presumption and thus to justify immigration restriction also justify the deportation of at least some citizens and nationals. Given that deporting these citizens and nationals on the basis of the proposed principles is intuitively impermissible, we should reject the principles and, in turn, immigration restriction.
- February 6: Rebecca Kukla, Georgetown University. “Medicalization, ‘Normal Function’, and the Definition of Health”
Abstract: The concept of health is surprisingly difficult to define in a rigorous and satisfying way. I argue that biologically based ‘normal function’ accounts and thoroughgoing social constructionist accounts of health are both deeply unsatisfying, particularly if we want the concept of health to play a substantial role in policy and social justice projects. I propose what I call an ‘institutional’ definition of health, and argue that it retains the objectivity that is appealing in biological accounts, along with the social constructionists’ important insight that health and disease are partially constituted by social context and by contingent, historical processes of medicalization.
- February 20: Steve Nadler, University of Wisconsin. “Why Was Spinoza Excommunicated?”
Abstract: In July of 1656, the twenty-three year old Baruch de Spinoza received the harshest writ of herem (excommunication) ever issued by the Amsterdam Portuguese-Jewish congregation. Full of vitriol and curses, the ban was final; Spinoza never reconciled with his community. But why was Spinoza punished with such extreme prejudice? The ban document mentions only his “abominable heresies” and “monstrous deeds”, without telling us what exactly they are. Spinoza had not yet published anything. So there is a bit of a mystery here. On the other hand, for anyone familiar with his mature philosophical treatises, there really can be no mystery as to why one of history’s most original and radical thinkers was ostracized by Amsterdam’s rabbis and the Jewish community’s lay leaders. In this talk, we will look at some of the main theses of Spinoza’s philosophy, in order to get a better sense of what so troubled his contemporaries.
- March 20: Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame. “Aesthetics as a Foil for Ethics: Generality and Justification in Moral and Aesthetic Judgment”
Abstract: Moral properties such as being wrong or being obligatory are not brute; they are based on other kinds of properties, such as (for acts) being a lie or being promised. Aesthetic properties such as being graceful or being beautiful are similar to moral properties in being based on other kinds of properties, but they are different in that, for aesthetic cases, it may be impossible to specify just what these grounding properties are. Does any single property ground poetic beauty in the way promising to do something grounds obligation to do it?
If aesthetic properties do differ from moral properties in this way, may we conclude that, although ethics is like aesthetics in being a realm of intuitive and perceptual knowledge–or at least intuitive and perceptual sensitivity–it is unlike aesthetics in being a realm of rules and guiding principles that connect grounding properties with aesthetic properties? Are there any such generalities in aesthetics, or even aesthetic generalities connecting aesthetic properties with other aesthetic properties? If there are, how much like or unlike rules and principles in ethics are they?
This presentation will explore all these questions in the light of examples from the arts, with poetry as the main case study.
- March 27: Kieran Setiya, University of Pittsburgh. “Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?”
Abstract: Moral theory corrupts the youth. The epistemic assumptions of moral theory deprive us of resources needed to resist the challenge of moral disagreement, which its practice at the same time makes vivid. The talk concludes by sketching a kind of epistemology that could respond to disagreement without skepticism: one in which the fundamental standards of justification for moral belief are biased towards the truth.
- April 3: Steve Grimm, Fordham University. “What Is Wisdom?”
Abstract: What is it that makes someone wise, or one person wiser than another? I try to explain what it is that the wise person knows in a way that sheds light on these questions. I also try to explain why contemporary philosophers have had so little to say about wisdom, in contrast to their ancient and medieval predecessors.
- April 10: Edward Knippers, http://www.edwardknippers.com
Description: Knippers is a well known representational artist who often paints Biblical scenes. His work has sometimes been controversial because these scenes regularly depict the biblical characters in the nude. Indeed, his work has been called sacrilegious by some religious observers. On the other hand, many critics find the depiction of traditional Christian themes outdated or otherwise objectionable. In this discussion, we will talk with Mr. Knippers about art, sacrilege, modernism, interpretation, and other ideas central to both art and philosophy.
- April 25: The talk by Professor Verity Harte of Yale University, has been canceled.
Dates and speakers for fall semester 2013
- October 17: Kit Wellman, Washington University in St. Louis. “Procedural Rights”
I will argue that, absent special circumstances, there are no moral, judicial procedural rights. I divide this essay into four main sections. First I argue that there is no general moral right against double jeopardy. Next I explain why punishing a criminal without first establishing her guilt via a fair trial does not necessarily violate her rights. In the third section I respond to a number of possible objections. Finally, (if time permits) I consider the implications of my arguments for the human right to due process.
- November 1: Kevin Schilbrack, Western Carolina University. “Religious Disagreement as a Process.” Co-sponsored with Department of Religion. Please note that this talk will be held at 3:30 pm in Wingate 302.
Abstract: Given the cultural and ideological divisions of the present day, disagreement has become an important topic among philosophers. In this paper, I propose that philosophers study disagreement not simply as a static conflict between those who hold contradictory views, but also as a navigable process of cognitive dissonance and its resolution. Doing so lets us see that important philosophical questions about disagreement arise not only when the disagreement is between epistemic peers, but also earlier in the process before one has assessed the other’s evidence or logic. In this paper, I argue that even before one has assessed the other’s reasons, the mere fact of disagreement usually ought to move a person to reduce confidence in one’s belief. I defend this claim and show its implications for religious disagreements.
- November 7: Sarah Robins, University of Kansas. “Remembering, Relearning, and (Temporarily) Forgetting”
What does remembering require? It is common to think that remembering requires not only an accurate representation of a past event, but also a representation that is brought about in the right way. According to the Causal Theory of Memory (CTM), the right way involves a memory trace. But what are memory traces? Recently, Bernecker (2010) has proposed that memory traces are mental states that form an uninterrupted causal chain between learning and remembering. I argue that this view cannot distinguish remembering from relearning, or tell the difference between temporarily and permanently forgetting something. I conclude by presenting an alternative view of memory traces as capacities.
- November 14: Valerie Tiberius, University of Minnesota. “Well-Being as Value Fulfillment: an Argument for Well-being Holism”
In this talk I present an overview of a theory of well-being that takes values rather than desires or preferences to be the key to well-being. According to the value fulfillment theory, a person’s life goes well to the extent that she pursues and fulfills or realizes things that she values where those values are emotionally suitable and seen by the person to make her life go well. This theory is holistic in the sense that it takes the contribution of individual moments of fulfillment to well-being to be determined by their role in an overall “value-full” life. I argue for holism on the grounds that a holistic theory provides us with the right critical perspective on our current desires and values.